CANTO -- Covert AutheNtication with Timing channels over Optimized
  traffic flows for CAN by Groza, Bogdan et al.
1CANTO - Covert AutheNtication with Timing
channels over Optimized traffic flows for CAN
Bogdan Groza, Lucian Popa and Pal-Stefan Murvay
Abstract—Previous research works have endorsed the use of
delays and clock skews for detecting intrusions or fingerprinting
ECUs on the CAN bus. Similar techniques have been also pro-
posed for establishing a time-covert cryptographic authentication
channel, in this way cleverly removing the need for cryptographic
material inside the limited payload of CAN frames. The main
shortcoming of such works is the limited security level that can be
achieved under normal CAN-bus traffic. In this work we endeav-
our to test the limits of the achievable security level by relying
on optimization algorithms for scheduling CAN frames. Under
practical bus allocations that are based on real-world scenarios,
we are able to extract around 4–5 bits of authentication data
from each frame which leads to an efficient intrusion detection
and authentication mechanism. By accumulating covert channel
data over several consecutive frames, we can achieve higher
security levels that are in line with current security demands. To
prove the correctness of our approach, we present experiments
on state-of-the-art automotive-grade controllers (Infineon Aurix)
and bus measurements with the use of industry standard tools,
i.e., CANoe.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Following small demonstrations for potential attacks on in-
vehicle buses, e.g., [18], the feasibility of attacking real-world
vehicles has been proved by recent works such as [22], [8],
[28], etc. All the security problems of in-vehicle networks stem
from the fact that the Controller Area Network (CAN) is a
decades-old bus which has no intrinsic security.
CAN is the most widely employed protocol for in-vehicle
communications. It can transmit up to 8 bytes of data in a
single frame (frame structure is depicted in Figure 1) at a
maximum bit rate of 1Mbit/s. Being built with reliability in
mind, CAN uses several mechanisms to assure this property.
Arbitration is performed as an ID-based bus access priority to
avoid collisions, while a 15 bit CRC aids in the identification
of bit errors. For avoiding synchronization loss, CAN uses bit
stuffing to ensure sufficient transitions in long sequences of
bits of the same value. After each five consecutive identical
bits, CAN introduces an additional bit of opposite value.
Following the recently reported attacks, the research com-
munity quickly answered with dozens of proposals for secur-
ing the CAN bus. As expected, most of these rely on the
use of cryptographic Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
(e.g., [17], [33], [23], [34], or more recently [3] and many
others). But due to the limited size of the CAN frame, i.e.,
64 bits, two options have been commonly discussed in the
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Fig. 1. Format of CAN data frames
literature: truncating the MAC code or sending the MAC as a
distinct packet. The last option creates additional problems
since sending a new authentication frame for each regular
frame doubles the bus-load and does not cope with practical
demands. Nonetheless, it introduces authentication delays. The
first procedure, MAC truncation, is supported by the more
recent security specifications introduced in the AUTOSAR [2]
architecture which require 24 bit security for a CAN frame.
However, reserving 24 bits out of the 64 bit CAN frame
payload for security may not be convenient as this is represents
37% of the payload. Additionally, the standard specifies 8
bits for a freshness parameter, leading to 32 bits reserved
for security purposes and thus 50% of the frame becomes
unusable for regular data. In general, it seems that including
cryptographic material in CAN frames remains somewhat
problematic as the small packet size of CAN is hardly able to
cope with the required level of security. A third option is to
hide the authentication bits by using alternative physical layers
such as CAN+ [39] which is an extension of CAN. Such an
approach was proposed in [32]. However, CAN+ transceivers
do not exist inside vehicles and due to the migration to
CAN-FD it seems unlikely for CAN+ to be adopted by the
automotive industry.
In a recent work, we exploited the fine-grained control of
timer-counter circuits in a constructive manner by designing
a time-covert cryptographic authentication channel [15]. This
proposal has the merit of allowing authentication to be carried
out outside the limited 64 bit payload of the CAN frame. How-
ever, the problem with the work in [15] is that performance
degrades significantly when the covert channel is placed over
existing (unoptimized) CAN-bus traffic. A similar approach for
creating a covert authentication channel based on frame arrival
time can be found in [38], but the achieved security level is
very limited at 1 covert bit for each CAN frame. Moreover, the
authentication in [38] is dedicated to the transmitter, not to the
content of the frame itself. On the other hand, covert timing
channels have been well explored in computer networks,
e.g., [4], [27], [7], but we are unaware of the use of such
channels for securing in-vehicle communication (except for the
aforementioned recent papers [15] and [38]). We emphasize
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Fig. 2. Basic depiction of the addressed scenario: ECUs sending/receiving packets on the CAN bus, authentication data is encoded in delays
that, in contrast to such works, our intention is not in keeping
the channel secret, but rather not interfering with the data-field
and keeping the bus free.
While there is not much related work on covert channels
for CAN, there are several related works that are in close
relation to our approach. Optimal traffic allocation with respect
to the security payload has been targeted by a small amount
of works dedicated to CAN security such as [25], [26], [24]
and [37]. These works do not target the creation of a covert
timing authentication channel, but they focus on optimization
problems for CAN traffic. Nonetheless, many recent research
works have been focusing on using frame arrival time, i.e.,
the delays that we use to create a covert channel, in order to
detect intrusions, e.g., [29] and [31]. By using Bloom filters
[6], frame arrival time has been also combined with frame
content to filter malicious activity in [14]. More recently, frame
periodicity has been exploited to extract clock skews which
is used to create a unique fingerprint for each ECU due to
physical imperfections in oscillators in [10]. This sets room
for physical fingerprinting of CAN nodes. The use of clock
skews has been explored for fingerprinting computers for more
than a decade by the work in [21] and not surprisingly it was
also applied to smart-phones [13]. Unfortunately, identification
mechanisms based on clock-skews are rendered ineffective
by the fine grained control of time-triggered interrupts on
embedded devices which allows ECUs to potentially fake their
clock-skews as demonstrated by [30]. All these works are
exploiting the precision of the clock circuitry in the controller,
which also stays at the core of our proposal here.
To save bits from the data-field, other works have suggested
the use of the identifier field, i.e., [16], [19], [36] and [35], but
this requires special care as the identifier field is critical for
arbitration and also used for filtering purposes. An alternative
to identify senders without compromising bits of the CAN
frame is to use physical signal characteristics, e.g., [11],
[12], [20], but these approaches may be vulnerable to small
variations in bus impedance.
Contribution in brief. In this work we create a covert
authentication channel, which leaves the bits in the CAN frame
unchanged, and increase its data rate by relying on efficient
frame scheduling. We do assume a bus-load of ≈ 40% which
complies with recommendations for real-world implementa-
tions. We discuss several frame allocation mechanisms and
find limits for the authentication payload that can be carried
in a covert manner. The addressed scenario is briefly outlined
in Figure 2. To avoid overloading the figure, only two ECUs
and one external device (potentially a CANcase) are depicted,
but there are no restrictions regarding the number of ECUs
or external devices in our scenario. The main advantages and
disadvantages of a covert authentication channel on the CAN
bus are the following:
• it does not consume bits from the data-field which is quite
limited at 64 bits,
• it covertly embeds authentication data in the frame that
carries the data, without requiring an additional authen-
tication frame,
• it does not increase the bus-load since authentication data
is hidden in delays.
The main concept behind how frame authentication works
in our proposal, i.e., encoding authentication data in delays
and adding optimizations for frame timings, is detailed in
Figure 3. CAN frames, depicted by the identifier field ID,
arrive on the bus in a cyclic manner (to avoid overloading
the figure, we omit the data-field, but this is used in the
message authentication code along with the ID). While on-
event frames may also exist on the CAN bus, the majority
of the CAN traffic is cyclic in nature and we focus our
work on authenticating such traffic. We depict identifiers for
3 distinct delays ∆ = 10, 20, 50ms. A drift ξ is added to each
delay which carries authentication data in a covert manner.
In principle ξ is the last byte of a cryptographic message
authentication code (MAC). This MAC is computed over the
content of the entire frame and will be distinct for every frame
assuming proper use of freshness parameters, e.g., timestamps
or counters. To avoid overloading the figure we omit such
details in the graphical outline. Due to improper allocation of
the CAN traffic, several packets may need to be transmitted
at the same time (this is suggested by packets highlighted
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Fig. 3. Overview of the mechanism: frame arrival on the bus at delays ∆ = 10, 20, 50ms with adjustment i, i = 1..3 and covert authentication delay ξ
resulting from a cryptographic MAC
in gray). Such schedule overlapping is not a problem from
a transmission point of view, however, it impedes correct
measurements of the arrival delays and thus the creation of a
covert authentication channel. To avoid such situations, we use
an additional delay i, i = 1..3 in order to allocate traffic in an
optimal manner and keep frame inter-distance at a maximum.
Figure 4 tries to clarify why unpredictable delays are
problematic for a time-covert channel. The left side of the
figure shows the inter-transmission times between frames as
recorded in a real-world vehicle. While the entire traffic is
cyclic, the inter-transmission time is noisy and deviations from
the expected arrival time do greatly interfere with the creation
of a time-covert channel. To improve performance we do rely
on optimization algorithms. The right side of Figure 4 shows
inter-transmission times after the traffic is optimized. The same
bus-load and the same number of IDs is used, but the inter-
transmission time now follows a clearer pattern. Creating a
covert timing channel is possible without bus optimizations,
but it is obvious that the optimized version will have a superior
bitrate due to less noise on the covert channel.
II. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section gives a brief overview on delays and clock
skews on the CAN network. Nonetheless we discuss limita-
tions in previous works on covert timing channels for the CAN
bus. Then we describe the components of our setup.
A. Clock skews and limitations in previous work
In Figure 5 we show how clock skews accumulate when
three ECUs are broadcasting at fix time intervals δ. While the
delay δ is fixed, due to clock imprecision, the time measured
at each ECU is in fact δ1, δ2 and δ3 respectively. If the first
ECU measures the arrival time for frames received from the
second and third ECUs, the delays accumulate. The result is
a slope which represents the skew of the clock.
Fig. 4. Delays between frames: real-world car (left) vs. optimized traffic on
our setup (right) at similar busload 30− 40%
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Fig. 5. Accumulation of clock skews for ECUs broadcasting at interval δ
Fig. 6. Accumulation of clock skews for a device broadcasting at 100 ms for
a longer period of 4 hours
In Figure 6 we show the clock skew from an experimental
measurement over a longer period of 4 hours (since each frame
4Fig. 7. Skews for a frame sent from an Infineon TC277 as recorded by an
Infineon board (left) or from CANoe/VN CAN adapter (right) in [15]
Fig. 8. Forced delays as recorded in [15] for a free bus (left) vs. a bus with
regular network traffic (right)
is sent at 100ms around 145.000 frames are depicted). The
slope of the line remains stable despite that the counter resets
at roughly 45.000 frames resulting in a small drift.
Figure 7 shows a graphical depiction for the delays mea-
sured on one Infineon board vs. CANoe in case of frames
broadcast periodically by another Infineon board. The depic-
tion is according to our previous work in [15]. Delays are
forced at ±100,±250,±500 clock ticks (1 tick is 10ns) and
thus several slopes are visible in the picture.
The main limitation of our previous work on creating covert
channels on the CAN bus was that existing traffic (poorly
allocated) impedes the data-rate of the covert channel. Figure
8 shows the variation of delays recorded on four Infineon
TriCore boards without (left) and with (right) existing network
traffic according to [15] (delays are expressed as a fraction
between the expected arrival time and recorded arrival time).
In case of existing traffic, some of the frames arrive with
significant delays making them indistinguishable for frames
that are sent with random delays. These delays contribute to
the false-positives of an intrusion detection mechanism. As we
discuss and show in this work, traffic optimization is the only
solution to this problem.
B. Setup components
We implement and evaluate optimizations on traffic allo-
cation using an AURIX TC224 TFT Application Kit. The
development board features a TC224 32-bit TriCore CPU that
runs at frequencies up to 133 MHz and provides 1MB of
FLASH memory and 96kB of RAM memory. The CAN frames
transmitted by our TriCore-based implementation are recorded
using CANoe, a software tool used for analyzing and testing
of automotive networks. To achieve this, the CANoe running
Fig. 9. Experimental setup used for generating and recording CAN traffic
according to the proposed mechanisms
PC is interfaced with the development board through an VN
CAN to PC adapter as depicted in Figure 9. The recorded
traces were analyzed offline using Mathematica.
Since, according to the described mechanism, CAN frames
have to be transmitted in specific time slots, nodes need
to implement a time keeping functionality. We implemented
this on the TC224 using the Capture/Compare Unit 6 Timer
(CCU6) module which was configured to trigger an interrupt
every 1 µs as a base tick for our local clock. Additionally, we
used the last 8 bits of a pre-computed MAC value as a delay,
multiple of 1 µs based on the CCU6 Timer’s ticks, between
the message cycle time + ε and the time when the message
was actually sent on the bus, in the time-covert channel.
All of the message data bytes, configured message cycle
times and the selected ε values for each message were con-
figured in the MultiCAN+ module. The MultiCAN+ module
is also responsible for transmitting the frame data to the CAN
transceiver with the specified baudrate of 500 kbps.
After performing the initial hardware setup, the initial MAC
values are calculated for each message. During runtime, based
on the counter value incremented in CCU6’s timer, the cycle
times for all frames and the ε values, each frame is sent, but
with a small delay as already described. The frame delivery
will take place after ξ ticks of the CCU6 Timer have expired.
After each frame delivery, the message counter is incremented
and a new MAC value is calculated based on the message data
and the message counter.
III. OPTIMIZING TRAFFIC ALLOCATION
This section addresses the optimization algorithms that we
use. Traffic allocation is essential for achieving a satisfactory
data-rate on the covert channel. We design and discuss four
algorithms for traffic allocation and prove their effectiveness
by both theoretical models/simulation and experimental data.
We use two of these algorithms in the next section and
implement the covert channel over optimized CAN-bus traffic.
5Fig. 10. Frame arrival time for a 64 bit data frame (left) and for a variable
frame 0–64 bits (right) with data rates from 64kbps to 500kbps
A. Problem statement
We consider a set of n pairs
{(id1,∆1), (id2,∆2), ..., (idn,∆n)}, each pair being formed
by a CAN identifier and the delays (periodicity) corresponding
to the identifier. If on-event frames exist, a distinct mechanism
should be used, this situation however is out of scope for our
work. Further, let {(idi, T i1), (idi, T i2), ..., (id1, T il )} be the set
of identifier-timestamp pairs where timestamp T ij ,∀j = 1..l
is the time at which idi was received on the bus. Ideally,
T ij+1−T ij = ∆i,∀i = 1..n, j = 1..l, which means that frames
having the same identifier ID are received at periodicity ∆i.
In practice however, there are many reasons that impede a
perfect arrival time. Besides clock drifts, i.e., the clock of
sender and receiver nodes is not identical, delays may occur
due to frames with overlapped sending time. Since CAN
arbitration is non-destructive, there is no problem if two
nodes try to send a frame at the same time. But the frame
with the higher ID loses arbitration and will be sent after
the smaller ID which makes the arrival time drift from the
expected ∆i.
Frame arrival time. The time required for a frame to be
transmitted on the bus depends on the size of the frame and
data rate of the bus. Datarate can be up to 1Mbps in standard
CAN, though lower datarates of 125-500kbps are commonly
employed. The size of the frame varies due to the number of
stuffing bits, i.e., one bit of reverse polarity is added after 5
consecutive identical bits (for a frame with 64 bits of data
plus the header, a maximum of 19 stuffing bits can be added).
The left side of Figure 10 shows the variation of frame arrival
time in case of a 64 bits data frame which expands to 111
bits (without stuffing bits) and which may take as little as
100µs on 1Mbps or up to 900µs on a low-speed 125kbps bus
(stuff bits not included). For a broader image, the right side
of Figure 10 expands this calculation for variable size frames
(0–64 bits) size and bus rates (64kbps–1Mbps).
Frame arrival time in real-world traces. In Figure 11 we
depict the arrival time for frames scheduled at 10, 40, 150 and
500ms. The left side of the figure shows the delay between
frames carrying the same ID and the right side the histogram
distribution of the same delay. Even for the higher priority
frame arriving at 10ms, deviations of 400µs are common.
For the 40ms frame deviations of 2− 4ms are common and
the situation is similar for the 150ms frame. In case of the
500ms frame, deviations of 10ms become common as well.
Such deviations from the expected arrival time exist and
they clearly lower the bitrate of a covert timing channel.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Fig. 11. Frame arrival time and histogram distribution of frame arrival time,
for frames arriving at 10ms, 40ms, 150ms and 500ms delays
The deviations from the expected arrival time are directly
influenced by local clocks and the priority of the message ID,
but these can be circumvented by clever allocation of frame
timings as we discuss next.
B. Optimizing frame scheduling
In the previously defined framework, if each frame is
sent at multiples of ∆i, i = 1..n, the collisions on the
bus between frame i, j, ∀i, j = 1..n will occur at multi-
ples of lcm(∆i,∆j) (here lcm stands for the least common
multiple of the two integers). This can be extended to any
number of frames. In theory, all frames will collide on
the bus at lcm(∆1,∆2, ...,∆n). Again, such collisions are
non-destructive but they impede the time-covert channel. To
avoid such collisions, we extend the frame scheduling set
to {(id1,∆1, 1), (id2,∆2, 2), ..., (idn,∆n, n)} where i, i =
1..n is a small drift added to the frame sending time. By our
allocation, frames will be sent at intervals k∆i+i (rather than
k∆i). Our optimization problem consists in finding the values
for i, i = 1..n such that for a given set of delays ∆i, i = 1..n
no collisions will occur on the bus and moreover, the space
between frames is maximized.
We use the following theoretical model to compute optimal
frame allocation. Let the following n sets of traces correspond-
ing to the n IDs broadcast over the CAN network:
6
T1 = {(id1, 1), (id2,∆1 + 1), (id3, 2∆1 + 1), ..., (id1, (l− 1)∆1 + 1)}
T2 = {(id2, 2), (id2,∆2 + 2), (id3, 2∆2 + 2), ..., (id2, (l− 1)∆2 + 2)}
...
Tn = {(idn, n), (idn,∆n + n), (id3, 2∆n + n), ..., (idn, (l− 1)∆n + n)}
Having the previous equations, we say that the frame
scheduling is complete if |T1 ∪ T2 ∪ ... ∪ Tn| = |T1|+ |T2|+
...+ |Tn| where |Ti|, i = 1..n denotes the cardinality of the set
Ti. By this condition on the equality of the sets, we request
that timings are distinct for all of the n frames.
Let T ∗ = {t1, t2, ..., tn} be the set containing all time
stamps for all messages, we assume this set to be sorted in
ascending order, i.e., the natural way in which frames are
expected to arrive on the bus. We say that the frame scheduling
is optimal if the following value is minimal:
q =
1
n
n∑
i=2
1
ti − ti−1
The quality factor q in the previous equation is defined in
order to assure a maximum inter-frame space (IFS). That is,
the larger the IFS, the smaller the values 1/(ti − ti−1) and
thus their sum will be smaller. In what follows we discuss four
variants of allocation algorithms that target the optimization
of the quality factor q.
A practical allocation example. The subsequent optimiza-
tion examples address the following frame periodicity vector
which is based on existing CAN traffic from a real-world
vehicle:
∆ = {10, 10, ..., 10︸ ︷︷ ︸
×6
, 20, 20, ..., 20︸ ︷︷ ︸
×8
, 50, 50, ..., 50︸ ︷︷ ︸
×12
, 100, 100, ..., 100︸ ︷︷ ︸
×14
}
That is, the vector contains 6 IDs that have a cycle time of
10ms, 8 IDs that have a cycle of 20ms, 12 IDs at 50ms and
finally 14 IDs with a cycle time of 100ms
Binary symmetric allocation. This is the simplest of the
allocation algorithms that we use, it is very easy to imple-
ment and gives good results (we improve however on the
inter-frame space with the next algorithms). In the binary
symmetric allocation, we start with a bin size equal to the
window size w which is the minimum of the delays w =
min (∆1,∆2, ...,∆n) and allocate all the values i, i = 1..n
to fit symmetrically in the interval [0..w]. For this we start with
a bin of size w then we create new values i-s by dividing each
existing bin. That is, 1 is first placed at w/2, then for 2 and 3
two new bins are created at w/4 and 3w/4, etc. The algorithm
is presented in Figure 12. We assume the delays appear in
rdelays in ascending order (∆1 is missing from the list since
it is already allocated to a default value 1 = 0). Variable blist
is instantiated with the first delay ∆1 (for which we allocate a
default value 0 = 0) and a second delay ∞ which is merely
a placeholder for delimiting the bin which has size ∆1. In
step 4 we loop until an i is generated for each value ∆i. For
this purpose, we create a new list blist ′ in step 5 and loop in
step 6 over all existing values in blist to create a new value
(blist [i−1, 1]−blist [i, 1])/2 that is added between blist [i−1]
and blist [i] in the newly created list blist ′. In step 15 blist
Algorithm 1 Binary symmetric allocation
1: procedure BINARY ALLOCATION
2: rdelays ← {∆2, ...,∆n}
3: blist ← {(0,∆1), (∆1,∞)}
4: while size(rdelays) > 0 do
5: blist ′ ← {blist [1]}
6: for i = 2, i ≤ size(blist) do
7: if size(rdelays) > 0 then
8: blist ′ ← append(blist ′, (blist [i− 1, 1]
−blist [i, 1])/2, rdelays[1]))
9: blist ′ ← append(blist ′, blist [i])
10: rdelays ← delete(rdelays, 1)
11: else
12: blist ′ ← append(blist ′, blist [i])
13: end if
14: end for
15: blist ← blist ′
16: end while
17: end procedure
Fig. 12. Algorithm for binary symmetric allocation
Fig. 13. Theoretical displacement of delays in case of binary symmetric
allocation: detail for delays lower than 300µs and overall view up to 1.2ms
for the first 2000 frames
Fig. 14. Experimental measurements from CANoe of an Infineon node
broadcasting after binary symmetric allocation: delays (left) and histogram
distribution of delays (right)
is replaced with blist ′ at each iteration. At the end of the
procedure blist will contain all pairs {(1,∆1), ..., (n,∆n)}.
A graphical depiction of the theoretical frame timings is in
Figure 13. In Figure 14 we present the experimental results as
measured from CANoe in when an Infineon node broadcasts
frames with the corresponding timings. The theoretical results
and experimental measurements are reasonably close. Differ-
ences exists as several frames are broadcast later resulting
in a 2.5ms inter-frame delay. The reason for this is that the
minimum inter-frame space is at 250µs which is also around
the time needed to place a frame on the bus at 500 kbps. Due
to computational delays on the controller, if the time-slot is
missed, the frame will be sent at some later point missing the
expected allocation on the bus. We conclude that 250µs for
inter-frame space is somewhat too short.
Randomized search allocation. The randomized search first
creates a list of i, i = 1..n that are equally spaced. A distance
set to e where e = min (∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)/n is a natural choice
since at worst all frames will appear during the periodicity of
7the fastest frame from the bus. However, other values may
be fixed for e. Then the i, i = 1..n values are allocated
randomly to each delay ∆i, i = 1..n. After ` iterations (each
consisting in a randomized allocation) the best allocation is
kept. The result improves with a higher number of iterations.
The algorithm is presented in Figure 15. First, the value of e
is computed in line 2, then values of the target epsilons are
generated in line 3 and stored in reps . The current optimum q
is set to∞ in line 6 and the best allocation reps ′′ is set to void
in line 7. Then we loop in line 8 for maxiterations . During each
loop, the new values reps ′ are set to a random permutation
from reps in line 9. Lines 10–16 compute the quality factor
q for the new allocation. For this, the set of timestamps
Tj , j = 1..n is generated for each delay, according to the
corresponding j of the current permutation. The timestamps
are computed for a timeframe T (in our practical tests we set
this to 1-10 seconds). Then the set of timestamps T ∗ is sorted
and q is computed accordingly. If the result is better than for
the previous optimum, i.e., line 17, the new result is stored in
reps ′′, otherwise it is dropped. The randomized search gave
somewhat better results than the binary symmetric allocation,
but again the 250µs seems to be problematic for some frames
(we improve on this with the next two algorithms). Figure
16 holds the theoretical expectations and Figure 17 holds the
experimental measurements, these are again reasonably close
to each other.
Greedy allocation. In the Greedy allocation, for n delays,
we first create bins that are equally spaced at distance e =
min(∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)/n (this is identical to the case of the
previous algorithm). Then we allocate the delays in ascending
order in such way that q is minimized. The algorithm is
summarized in Figure 18. The algorithm starts by building the
set of values i, i = 1..n in a similar way to the randomized
allocation described previously. Then it loops for each delay
in line 7 and for each of the remaining values  loops again in
line 10 in order to find the optimum value for the current delay.
Each of the selected values is tested against the optimization
criteria in a similar manner to the randomized allocation. The
index of the optimal value is stored in ind and this is removed
from the  values stored in reps in line 21 such that only
the remaining values could be allocated for the next delay
∆i. Figure 19 and 20 hold the theoretical expectations and
experimental measurements. The results are closer than for
the previous two algorithms which suggests Greedy to be a
better optimization.
Greedy Multi-Layer. To finally circumvent the 250µs inter-
frame space issues we modify the Greedy allocation to a Multi-
Layer Greedy allocation in which frames at delay ∆i, i = 1..n
are allowed to be placed at any multiple of e that is smaller
than ∆i. This allows for a better expansion of the frames since
frames at a larger ∆i can benefit from a larger i. We skip
formalism for this algorithm to avoid overloading the paper.
The theoretical and experimental results are in Figures 21 and
22. This time the results are almost identical and the inter-
frame space is expanded to up to 500µs.
GCD based allocation. We also try a Greatest Common
Divisor (GCD) based allocation in which the frames are spaced
by a delay, e.g., fixed at 500µs + δi where δi, i = 1..n,
Algorithm 2 Randomized allocation
1: procedure RANDOMIZED ALLOCATION
2: e← min(∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)/n
3: reps ← {0, e, 2e, ..., (n− 1)e}
4: delays ← {∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)}
5: i = 1
6: q ←∞
7: reps ′′ ←⊥
8: while i ≤ maxiterations do
9: reps ′ = randomize(reps)
10: T ∗ ← {}
11: for j = 1, i ≤ n, j = j + 1 do
12: Tj ← {k∆j + reps ′[j]; k = 1..bT/∆jc}
13: T ∗ ← append(T ∗, Tj)
14: end for
15: T ∗ ← sort(T ∗)
16: q′ = 1
n
∑|T∗|
i=2
1
ti−ti−1
17: if q′ < q then
18: reps ′′ = reps ′
19: q = q′
20: end if
21: end while
22: end procedure
Fig. 15. Algorithm for Randomized search
Fig. 16. Theoretical displacement of delays in case of Randomized allocation:
detail for delays lower than 300µs and overal view up to 1.2ms for the first
2000 frames
Fig. 17. Experimental measurements from CANoe of an Infineon node broad-
casting after Randomized allocation: delays (left) and histogram distribution
of delays (right)
which is a multiple of gcd(∆1,∆2, ...,∆n) subject to the
condition that 500µs + δi is smaller than ∆i. The algorithm
is depicted in Figure 23. It starts from building a matrix M
of max(delays)/G rows and min(delays)/ columns, where
G is the greatest common divisor of the delays and  is the
minimum allowable IFS. The matrix is initially filled by 1s.
Then in step 7 the algorithm loops for all the delays searching
for each of them an empty row in the matrix M . The search
is done in the loop from step 11 starting from row j = 1
(initialized in step 9) and continuously increases j in step
35 until a row without 0s is found. To test that the current
row has non-zero values, the loop in step 14 goes until the
end of the current line aux. If the resulting k is smaller than
the length of the line |aux|, then starting from step 17, the
line is filled with zeros at l = d/G steps (where d is the
8Algorithm 3 Greedy allocation
1: procedure GREEDY ALLOCATION
2: e← min(∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)/n
3: reps ← {0, e, 2e, ..., (n− 1)e}
4: reps ′ ← {}
5: delays ← {∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)}
6: T ∗ ← {}
7: for i = 1, i ≤ size(delays), i = i+ 1 do
8: opt =∞
9: ind = 1
10: for j = 1, j ≤ size(reps), j = j + 1 do
11: T ∗aux ← T ∗
12: Tj ← {k∆j + reps ′[j]; k = 1..bT/∆jc}
13: T ∗aux ← append(T ∗aux , Tj)
14: T ∗aux ← sort(T ∗aux )
15: opt ′ = 1
n
∑T∗aux
i=2
1
ti−ti−1
16: if opt ′ < opt then
17: ind = j
18: opt = opt ′
19: end if
20: end for
21: reps ← remove(reps, ind)
22: reps ′ ← append(reps ′, ind)
23: Ti ← {k∆i + reps ′[i]; k = 1..bT/∆ic}
24: T ∗ ← append(T ∗, Ti)
25: end for
26: end procedure
Fig. 18. Algorithm for Greedy allocation
current delay). The result for the current delay is placed in
reps in line 31. The allocation provides results similar to the
case of the Multi-Layer Greedy allocation, the runtime of the
algorithm is however much faster. A potential drawback is
that the algorithm doesn’t search for minimizing q, it rather
places frames at a minimum IFS fixed to . The theoretical and
experimental results are in Figures 24 and 25 and we attempt
to increase the inter-frame space to 600µs which we succeed.
In Table I we summarize a comparison between the four
optimization algorithms. The main drawback with the first
three algorithms is that they leave a minimum inter-frame
space of only 150µs - 250µs which is problematic since it
may be smaller than the transmission window for a single
frame (this may cause delays that pile-up and compromise the
data-rate of the covert channel). The multi-layer Greedy and
circular GCD show better performance and the minimum IFS
is kept at 500µs which sufficient for the transmission of single
frames.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS
Completeness q-Factor Min IFS Max IFS
Binary Sym. Search X 2.37 0.15 2.5
Randomized Search X 2.51 0.25 1.25
Greedy Search X 2.39 0.25 1.25
Greedy ML Search X 1.50 0.5 1.1
Circular GCD X 1.86 0.5 1.0
Fig. 19. Theoretical displacement of delays in case of Greedy allocation:
detail for delays lower than 300µs and overal view up to 1.2ms for the first
2000 frames
Fig. 20. Experimental measurements from CANoe of an Infineon node
broadcasting after Greedy allocation: delays (left) and histogram distribution
of delays (right)
Fig. 21. Theoretical displacement of delays in case of Multi-Layer Greedy
allocation: detail for delays lower than 300µs and overall view up to 1.2ms
for the first 2000 frames
Fig. 22. Experimental measurements from CANoe of an Infineon node
broadcasting after Multi-Layer Greedy allocation: delays (left) and histogram
distribution of delays (right)
IV. PROTOCOL AND RESULTS
In this section we give an outline of the protocol, then
we discuss practical results on the covert timing channel that
carries authentication tags.
A. Main protocol
In the current work we are focused on bus optimization for
achieving a maximum capacity for the covert channel. The
protocol for sending and receiving frames is not distinct from
our previous proposal [15] named INCANTA since we use
the same kind of covert channel based on the drift of the
frame from the expected arrival time. A minor difference is
that to each delay ∆i, i = 1..n we add the corresponding value
i, i = 1..n resulting from the optimization algorithm. For
consistency, we keep the same name and description for our
protocol INCANTA (INtrusion detection in Controller Area
Networks with Time-covert cryptographic Authentication). IN-
CANTA consists in the following set of actions that are to be
followed by each node:
1) SendCyclic(idi,m) is the procedure triggered at some
fixed delays k∆i + i for a frame with identifier field
9Algorithm 4 GCD-based allocation
1: procedure GCD-BASED ALLOCATION
2: delays ← {∆1,∆2, ...,∆n)}
3: G← gcd(delays)
4: ← 0.5
5: reps ←⊥
6: M ← 1[1..max(delays)/G][1..min(delays)/]
7: for i = 1, i ≤ size(delays), i = i+ 1 do
8: d← delays[i]
9: j = 1
10: s = false
11: while s = false&j ≤ |M | do
12: k = 1
13: aux = M [j]
14: while k ≤ |aux |&aux [k] = 0 do
15: k = k + 1
16: end while
17: if k ≤ |aux | then
18: l = d/G
19: a = k
20: s = true
21: while a ≤ |aux | do
22: if aux [a] 6= 0 then
23: aux [a] = 0
24: a = a+ l
25: else
26: s = false
27: end if
28: end while
29: if s = true then
30: M [j] = aux
31: reps = append(reps, (j − 1))
32: end if
33: end if
34: end while
35: j = j + 1
36: end for
37: end procedure
Fig. 23. Algorithm for GCD-based allocation
Fig. 24. Theoretical displacement of delays in case of GCD at 0.6ms
allocation: detail for delays lower than 300µs and overal view up to 1.2ms
for the first 2000 frames
Fig. 25. Experimental measurements from CANoe of an Infineon node
broadcasting after GCD allocation at 0.6ms inter-frame space: delays (left)
and histogram distribution of delays (right)
idi at which the responsible sender ECU computes the
tag tag = MAC k(k, idi,m) where k is a counter that is
incremented for each new message to be send. The sender
then sets T = btagc` and performs a wait operation
wait(T) then broadcasts message (id,m),
2) RecCyclic(idi,m) at which the kth instance of a message
with identifier idi is received. Let time tk be the time
at which the message is received, the receiver computes
tag = MAC k(k, id,m) and Tk = btagc` then checks if
|tk − tk−1| − (delta+ Tk − Tk−1)| ≤ ρ and if this fails
it drops the frame and reports an intrusion otherwise it
considers the frame as genuine.
We consider that a shared secret key k exists on each
ECU from the CAN bus. We do not discuss how this
key is shared since this is addressed by several other
works. Moreover, we consider that the frame-scheduling set
{(id1,∆1, 1), (id2,∆2, 2), ..., (idn,∆n, n)} is available to
all genuine ECUs on the network. The delay is computed
as the difference between two consecutive timestamps for the
same ID in order to remove potential clock-skews. Indeed, by
experimental measurements we did determine that clock skews
may impede correct identification of delays. Concrete values
for practical instances of the scheme and results are discussed
next.
B. Adversary model
We consider the regular type of Dolev-Yao adversary that
has full control over the communication channel. We note
however that removing a genuine node from the bus is not
easy in automotive-based scenarios since this requires either
physical intervention or placing the node in the bus-off state.
The later possibility has been recently demonstrated in [9] by
exploiting the CAN error management system but it requires
active error flags (which are visible on the bus) and the genuine
node will remain in the bus-off state only for a fixed period of
time. Moreover, removing a node will likely result in losing
many functionalities from the car and many IDs from the bus, a
behaviour which will likely be immediately recognized by the
remaining ECUs. If the adversary cannot remove the genuine
node from the bus it is very likely that the only effect of the
adversary’s intervention will be a DoS since injected frames
will likely cause delays even for genuine frames. Addressing
such a situation may be future work for us, but due to the
design of the CAN bus a DoS will be always feasible, e.g.,
the adversary could simply corrupt any frame by overwriting
one recessive bit with a dominant bit (this in turn may lead
to a CRC error and all nodes will respond with active error
flags, etc.).
Assuming that the adversary can by some mean target a
genuine node or a specific ID and remove it from the bus,
the adversary further has to guess the exact delay at which
the genuine frame needs to be sent. The success rate of an
adversary can be estimated synthetically as:
adv =
ρ
2`
Here ρ is the delay tolerance for accepting a frame and `
is the security level (this are part of the protocol description
that follows). This models the expected scenario where an
adversary can at best insert a frame at some random point
that hopefully will match the expected delay.
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(i)
(ii)
Fig. 26. Interframe delays (broadcast from Infineon TriCore node) in case
of circular GCD optimization 0.5 without a covert channel (i) and with the
covert channel in place (ii)
C. Results
In Figure 26 we give an overview on the inter-frame delays
on the bus with (ii) and without (i) the covert channel in place.
Note that when the covert channel is in place, the delays vary
with ±128µs. This becomes more evident in the details from
the right side of the picture for the case of frames separated
by only 500µs.
The experiments that we carried proved to be consistent for
all the IDs, regardless of the delays at which they are sent, i.e.,
10, 20, 50 or 100ms. The variation of the estimated delay was
in the order of ±10µs which is consistent with the time of 5
CAN bits (at 500kbps the duration of one bit on the CAN bus
≈ 2µs). This variation may be due to the variation in frame
length due to the number of stuffing bits which differs (we
improve on this next).
Figure 27 shows the delays and their histogram distribution
for frames broadcast at at 10ms (i), 20ms (ii), 50ms (iii)
and 100ms (iv). Note that there are fewer samples as the
delay increases. The deviation from the expected arrival time
remains in the aforementioned range of ±10µs for all frames
and IDs. This is a good result considering the busload which
is identical to real-world operation of the CAN bus.
To go even further, we have also taken the frame length into
account and achieve a better match as depicted in Figure 28.
The minimum error for all messages was at −4.62µs and the
maximum at 4.87µs which means that at a 5µs tolerance all
genuine messages will get the intended delay.
In Table II we give the average rate for the true negatives
given the 2, 3 or 4µs tolerance bound. We depict both the suc-
cess rate for the genuine frames, i.e., ecu , and the adversary
advantage adv . In case of ecu , the values are computed as the
mean value taken over all the 40 IDs in a trace covering around
1.2 million frames. Concretely, the 2µs error covered between
91.4%− 95.2% depending on the ID, while the 3µs and 4µs
covered 99.21% − 99.93% and 99.96% − 100% respectively.
The adversary advantage adv is synthetically computed as
discussed previously. We also extend these results for the case
of multiple frames, i.e., over k frames, the adversary advantage
becomes kadv . The same happens for the advantage of the
genuine frames which is now kecu . In case when the 5µs
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Fig. 27. Experimental measurements for covert authenticated frames from an
Infineon TriCore node: deviation from the expected delays (left) and histogram
distribution (right) for an ID sent at 10ms (i), 20ms (ii), 50ms (iii) and
100ms (iv)
TABLE II
SUCCESS RATES WITH TOLERANCE  ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}µs
ρ 1 frame 2 frames 3 frames 4 frames 6 frames
%
2µs
ecu 93.34 87.14 81.34 75.93 66.10
adv 1.5 0.2 0.0003 < 10−5 < 10−8
3µs
ecu 99.56 99.12 98.68 98.25 97.38
adv 2.3 0.05 0.001 < 10−4 < 10−7
4µs
ecu 99.99 99.98 99.97 99.96 99.94
adv 3.1 0.09 0.002 < 10−4 < 10−7
5µs
ecu 100 100 100 100 100
adv 3.9 0.15 0.005 < 10−3 < 10−6
tolerance is used, all genuine frames are to be accepted, while
the chance of an adversary to inject a frame is less than 1 in
a million. Six frames are to be received in 1.5 − 6ms as we
discuss later, thus the authentication delay is not high.
In Figure 29 we depict an estimation for the adversary
success rate compared to an 15-bit security level (left) and 24-
bit security level (right). The 15-bit security level was chosen
for comparison since it is the size of the CRC for CAN frames
(the CRC is not resilient in front of adversaries but it worths
as comparison), while the 24-bit security level is demanded
by AUTOSAR [2]. The required security level of AUTOSAR
can be reached in 5–6 frames.
Data-rate of the covert channel. The data-rate of noisy
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Fig. 28. Experimental measurements for covert authenticated frames from an
Infineon TriCore node: deviation from the expected delays (left) and histogram
distribution (right) for an ID sent at 10ms (i), 20ms (ii), 50ms (iii) and
100ms (iv)
Fig. 29. Adversary success rate, i.e., adv , in 1–8 frames at ρ = 5µs (ecu =
1.0 all genuine frames accepted)
Fig. 30. Delay between 3 (left) or 6 (right) consecutive frames
channels can be computed with Arimoto-Blahut algorithms
[1], [5]. To use these algorithms we have first extracted
the channel matrix which gathers the probability that delay
∆′ ∈ [1, 256]µs is encoded into delay ∆′′ ∈ [1, 256]µs. Once
the channel was computed we used a freely available Matlab
implementation of the algorithm1 and determined that channel
1https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/32757-channel-
capacity-using-arimoto-blahut-algorithm
capacity is ≈ 4.9 bits. Again, this suggests that the 24-bit
security level can be achieved in six CAN frames. This data-
rate can be also estimated from the results in Table II since
by setting a tolerance to 10µs we get a noiseless channel. But
now the 256 symbols are reduced to 25 and thus a data-rate of
≈ 4.6 bits (this is a bit lower of the channel capacity computed
with Arimoto-Blahut algorithms which gives an upper-bound).
Multi-frame authentication. Cumulating delays over multi-
ple frames is an option for increasing the security level. In 3
consecutive frames the security level is around 12 bits while
for 6 consecutive frames it reaches the desired 24 bits for in-
vehicle security. The authentication delay tops at 1.3ms for
3 frames and 6ms for 6 consecutive frames as depicted in
Figure 30. This is just a worst case scenario since often the
space between frames is 500µs and thus around 1.5ms or
3ms are to be expected. This is a very small delay for the
24 bit authentication level considering that no cryptographic
operation is needed except for the regular MAC and the bus-
load is not increased.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We provide optimizations for scheduling CAN frames in
order to reach an increased level of security on a time-covert
cryptographic channel. The four optimization algorithms that
we study show clear advantages for creating a covert timing
channel on CAN. The Greedy Search and Circular GCD give
better results, with a minimum inter-frame distance of 500
µs which can further accommodate time-covert authentication.
Over the optimized bus, the delays drift only in the ±10µs
range which roughly corresponds to the the time of 5 CAN
bits (the number of bits in each frame may drift due to stuffing
bits). With these small deviations, around 4 bits can be covertly
carried by each frame which means that the 24-bit security
level demanded by recent standards may be reached in about
6 frames. Given the data rate and the fact that frames are
spaced by around 250 − 500µs this means that 24 security
bits may be cumulated in around 3ms. Maintaining such strict
delays is not necessarily easy, but we believe that modern
microcontrollers can cope with them. Based on our analysis,
the drifts from the expected arrival time are mostly caused
by unoptimized traffic rather than by the accuracy of the
controller’s clock. Our procedures help in this direction by
optimizing traffic allocation. Further investigations are needed
to test the feasibility of the proposed procedures inside a real-
world vehicle. Since modern time-triggered protocols, such
as FlexRay, demand synchronization in the order of 10µs
in the worst case, we believe that covert channels may be
implemented at the rigorous timing demands from our work.
At the very least, we report an experimental upper bound, i.e.,
4-5 bits, for such covert channels under optimized traffic flows.
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